Challenging the Dichotomy of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values: Feminist Values and Evolutionary Psychology

There has been a passionate debate over the roles of non-cognitive values (e.g., moral, political, or cultural values) in the context of justification of scientific theories. The traditional view claims that these values cannot have a relevant, beneficial role because they undermine those aspects of scientific reasoning from which science draws its epistemic authority (e.g., McMullin 1982; Lacey 1999). More recently, several philosophers have challenged this view and claimed that non-cognitive values play a relevant role in the context of justification (e.g., Longino 1990; Rooney 1992; Anderson 1995; Intemann 2005). This paper joins the second camp by demonstrating that a particular kind of non-cognitive values – feminist values – does not necessarily compromise the epistemic authority of science. On the contrary, in some circumstances, they can improve scientific reasoning. By analyzing the influence of feminist values on evolutionary psychology and evolutionary biology, this paper shows how non-cognitive values have cognitive and non-cognitive functions at the same time.

Wednesday, January 25th, 2017
14:45 – 16:00
Leibniz Universität Hannover
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Am Klagesmarkt 14-17
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